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What Does China Mean for
Pragmatism?
A Philosophical Interpretation of Dewey’s Sojourn in China (1919-1921)
Roberto Gronda
 
1. Twilight of Idols, Birth of New Ideas
1 “I think of James now because the recent articles of John Dewey’s on the war suggest a
slackening  in  his  thought  for  our  guidance  and  stir,  and  the  inadequacy  of  his
pragmatism as a philosophy of life in this emergency” (Bourne 1917: 199). With these
famous words Randolph Bourne – a pupil of Dewey at Columbia University – expressed his
bitter disappointment with Dewey’s endorsement of American intervention in the first
World War.  The violence of  Bourne’s  words –  “slackening in his  [Dewey’s]  thought,”
“inadequacy” – reveals the violence of the shock caused by Dewey’s sudden decision to
side with the pro-war faction. Dewey was not simply a pacifist; he was widely perceived as
one of the leading intellectuals of the pacifist movement. No surprise, therefore, that
Dewey’s endorsement had stricken many of his friends and readers like a blow to the face.
2 Bourne’s  charge  was  simple  and  direct:  he  argued  that  Dewey’s  philosophy  was  an
inspiring philosophy “for a society at peace” since it relied on the belief that human
beings’ greatest desire is for happiness and prosperity (Bourne 1917: 201). In this context,
Bourne remarked, Dewey was right in holding that the best method at our disposal to
achieve  those  goals  was  the  scientific  mentality,  which  investigated  the  intelligent
relations between means and ends.  However,  in a time of war where these favorable
conditions were no longer available, where the “store of rationality” was gone, human
beings had experience of an increasing development and growth of irrational forces. In
these conditions, Bourne concluded, Dewey’s pragmatism proved itself to be an unreliable
tool for shedding light on the problems of men.1
3 In what follows I will try to assess whether Bourne’s remarks may function as a reliable
historiographical  hypothesis  which  would  make  sense  of  Dewey’s  philosophical
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development. The period from 1916 to 1921 is the most enigmatic in Dewey’s life, from
many different points of view. It is not by chance, I think, that relatively few studies have
been devoted to investigating the transformations undergone by his thought in this brief
span of time; it is as if the traditional interpretative categories that we usually apply to
Dewey’s philosophy reveal themselves to be not completely reliable when we turn our
attention to the war and immediately post-war years. The thesis that I will articulate in
the present article  is  that  Dewey became engaged in a long and tortuous process of
revision of his own philosophical position – a process which started in 1915, immediately
after the outbreak of the First World War, continued during the war years, and lasted
until about 1921, when he eventually went back to the United States after a two-year stay
in China. I will suggest that that was a period marked by a need to put his philosophical
assumptions to the test of reality, to be concrete, to be as close as possible to the world
and to its complexity. 
4 Consequently, I will assume that Bourne’s criticism was substantially correct: at the time
in which America had to decide whether or not to enter the war, Dewey’s philosophy was
inadequate to account for what was going on, and it could not supply Americans with the
intellectual  tools  needed to choose rationally  among the various,  possible  courses  of
action. But this is one part of the story. It should be added, indeed, that contrary to what
Bourne seemed to believe, Dewey was well aware that the war in which America was
becoming involved posed serious problems to his philosophy. He clearly perceived that
his conceptual apparatus was not rich enough to account for the complexity of the new
forces that were set in motion by that event.
5 In other words, what Bourne did not realize when he wrote “The Twilight of Idols” was
that, at that time, Dewey’s philosophy had already undergone significant modifications.
According to the reading presented here, during the war years Dewey became aware that
his philosophy was not sensitive enough to the complexity of the activity of thinking, and
struggled to shape new conceptual tools that could account for those aspects (the social
conditioning of thought, the ‘ideological’ composition of social reality) that had not been
adequately taken into consideration in his previous texts. The problem with which Dewey
was  concerned  was  that  of  understanding  the  plurality  of  functions  performed  by
theories and ideas in social life. Indeed, the clarification of the manifold effects of theory
on social reality was necessary to the formulation of a sound pragmatist social philosophy
– a project which, as Frega has convincingly shown in his contribution to the present
symposium, was the hinge on which Dewey’s philosophical work in the years 1918-1923
turned. To realize how important and how difficult it was for Dewey to come to term with
that problem, it is enough to read the first chapter of the Lectures in China. In that chapter,
significantly entitled “The function of theory,” Dewey wrote that the question of the
practical effect of theory was “the first great question concerning social philosophy” (Dewey
2015: I.3). However, his approach to that question was far from being clear and consistent:
apparently, he conflated the different functions performed by theories, thus blurring the
distinction  between  the  effects  that  theories  brought  about  when  used  as  tools  to
reconstruct a problematic situation and the effects that stemmed from the fact that social
reality is ‘ideal’ through and through, human behavior being necessarily in the realm of
ideas and theories. Such a confusion – which was probably due to the need to provide his
audience with all the concepts required to understand his argument in a small amount of
time – is evidence of the tensions that marked his thought in that period of his life.
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6 In the following pages I will highlight the most relevant stages of the process that led
Dewey to develop his new, original ‘theory of theory,’ as preliminary to the formulation
of his social philosophy. I  will  not deal explicitly with his Lectures in China, but I will
provide some background knowledge that I hope will be useful to understanding that
text’s  place  and  significance  in  the  overall  context  of  Dewey’s  thought.  The
reconstruction attempted in this article is articulated in three distinct moments, which
correspond to three different problematic situations with which Dewey found himself
confronted. In section 2, I will discuss Dewey’s reaction to German militarism, and I will
emphasize the philosophical importance of the widely-neglected book German Philosophy
and Politics  within the economy of  his  thought.  In section 3,  I  will  focus on Dewey’s
reflections  on  the  problem  of  propaganda,  in  order  to  bring  to  light  the  logical
conclusions that he drew from the experience of the effects of the First World War on
American society. Finally, in section 4, I will analyze Dewey’s writings on China, with a
particular  attention to the articles  in which he described and explained the Chinese
civilization to his American audience. I will suggest that these articles present us with an
extremely  interesting  and original  account  of  the  nature  of  thinking activity,  which
unfortunately  almost  disappeared  in  Dewey’s  later  thought.  Such  an  account  was
grounded on the theoretical results that he had achieved in the previous years – actually,
it  would  not  have  been possible  without  them –  and was  the  direct  outcome of  an
extraordinary experience of intercultural exchange. From such a perspective, I will argue
that Dewey’s confrontation with the Chinese situation represented the completion of a
line of  thought aimed at  reaching what may be labeled – using a famous Gramscian
expression – “the absolute secularisation and earthliness of thought” (Gramsci 1971: 465).
 
2. Understanding Germany: Philosophies of Life and
Cultural Relativism
7 On October, 4th, 1914 the New York Times published an appeal to ‘the civilized world’
signed by about one hundred influential German artists and intellectuals. The manifesto
was intended to protest against ‘the lies and calumnies’ that were thrown at their country
by those whom they referred to as ‘our enemies’ – that is, the Allies led by British and
French governments and presses.  The appeal’s  signatories –  who proudly proclaimed
themselves ‘heralds of truth’ – dismissed the accusations of cruelty and illegitimate use of
violence by the German army as well as any charge that Germany was responsible for the
war,  and  argued  that,  for  historical  reasons,  militarism was  a  distinctive  feature  of
German culture. 
8 Dewey was strongly impressed by the content of the manifesto. As is well known, his most
elaborated  answer  to  the  issue  of  Germanism was  outlined in  German  Philosophy  and
Politics, originally published in 1915 (and then significantly reprinted in 1942).  In this
extremely controversial little book, Dewey argued rather surprisingly that the origin of
German militarism should be sought not in Nietzsche’s philosophy of power – as many
contemporary interpreters were inclined to do – but in Kant’s thought with its distinction
between phenomena and noumena. If one looked more closely to the German culture,
Dewey remarked,  one could not escape from the impression that  “the chief  mark of
distinctively  German  civilization  is  its  combination  of  self-conscious  idealism  with
unsurpassed technical efficiency and organization in the varied fields of action”: “[i]f this
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is not a realization in fact of what is found in Kant,” Dewey concluded, “I am totally at
loss for a name by which to characterize it” (MW 8: 151).
9 Dewey did not maintain that Germans consciously adhered to the philosophy of Kant,
that each and every action they did, or every decision they take, was evaluated in the
light of that system of thought. He was well aware that a reading of this sort would have
implied an overestimation of the power of ideas to control and direct human behavior.
More cautiously, he argued that “Kant detected and formulated the direction in which
the German genius was moving,” and that “[i]n bringing to an imaginative synthesis what
might have remained an immense diversity of enterprises, Kantianism helped formulate a
sense of a national mission and destiny” (MW 8: 152). Kantianism provided Germans with
a “banner and a conscious creed” in whose terms they could harmonize their external
acts  and their  internal  feelings and desires in the most  consistent way (MW 8:  152).
“Outside of Germany,” Dewey remarked, “the career of the German idealistic philosophy
has been mainly professional and literary”; it was in countries like France, England and
the United States that it had revealed its purely theoretical significance (MW 8: 199). In
Germany it performed a broader function: it was a ‘philosophy of life.’ 
10 As  is  well  known,  Dewey’s  provocative  interpretation  of  German civilization  and  its
relation with American culture has been widely discussed and criticized. It is not my
intention to take a position on this issue since it is not necessary for my present purposes.
My point is more modest. I would simply like to avoid throwing away the baby with the
bath water: the undeniable defects and shortcomings of Dewey’s historical reconstruction
should not impede us from seeing the important theoretical achievements that made that
very analysis possible.  More clearly stated, the thesis that I  want to defend is that it
would have been impossible for Dewey to thematize the relation between philosophy and
politics in the way in which the issue is presented in German Philosophy and Politics if he
had relied strictly on the standpoint formulated in his previous works. According to this
reading, the introduction of the notion of philosophy of life represented a remarkable
moment of rupture and change in Dewey’s philosophical development, which forced him
to profoundly revise his conceptual apparatus. 
11 First of all, the very idea of a philosophy of life was difficult to accommodate within a
theoretical framework that conceived of theories as tools for solving problems. Dewey’s
standard account of ideas and theories – for instance, as formulated in the Studies in
Logical Theory – emphasized almost exclusively their logical value. Dewey’s view was that
the  distinction  between  suggestions  and  ideas  emerges  precisely  from  the  need  of
distinguishing the pre-reflective material of mental life (what comes unreflectively to our
mind) from that very material in a later stage of its development, when it happens to
acquire logical significance and value as a consequence of its being tested and controlled
(for a definition of suggestion see, for instance, MW 6: 207ff.).  Ideas and theories are
logical notions which refer to a particular set of tools that originate within the process of
inquiry, and whose import depends on their capacity to meet the needs and demands of
the problematic situation that they are supposed to reconstruct. Now, it is evident that
the way in which Dewey described the function performed by Kantian philosophy in the
German world could not be traced back to the logical function performed by theories and
ideas in the context of an inquiry. In the latter case, the function of a theory is that of
rationally reconstructing a problematic situation; in the former, it is that of providing a
general pattern of action, thought, and feeling that controls and directs the behavior of a
group of people by working on a pre-rational, emotional level. 
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12 For similar reasons, the conflict between the various philosophies of life could not be
explained by reducing it to the conflict arising between alternative philosophical theories
about a certain subject-matter. Indeed, the two kinds of conflict are governed by two
different logics. Dewey was well aware of their difference since he was a master of the
dialectical treatment of philosophical questions, and in many of his pre-war writings –
especially those dealing with ethical theory – he had made a large use of that technique of
analysis. In those texts, Dewey usually presented his own position as the synthesis of
different, competing philosophical theories. First of all, he started with arguing that the
traditional  accounts were flawed;  then he tried to locate the specific  source of  their
disagreement;  and  finally,  he  showed  that  neither  of  the  two  theories  adequately
accounted for a given range of phenomena because each theory selected a single aspect of
the explanandum as determinant of the others. In doing so, Dewey showed that the two
alternative  theories  adopted the  same reductionist  approach which conceived of  the
organic whole – for instance, the ethical behavior – as a sort of mechanism made up of
single, independent parts, some of which were more fundamental than the others. As
Dewey wrote in his Ethics, “the various types of theory are not arbitrary personal devices
and  constructions,  but  arise  because,  in  the  complexity of  the  subject-matter,  one
element  or  another  is  especially  emphasized,  and  the  other  elements  arranged  in
different perspectives” (MW 5:  209).  A more promising approach,  therefore,  was that
which acknowledged that no part was subordinate to the other, but that all the different
elements were equally important moments of a whole. In the light of this assumption, the
conflict between different philosophical theories could be recomposed in a higher unity,
that is,  in a higher explanation that gave equal recognition to all  the features of the
subject-matter. 
13 Now, such a re-composition and reconciliation – which is the goal of the philosophical
discussions – could not be attained in the case of conflicting philosophies of life. Indeed, it
would be meaningless to say that the conflict between German and American philosophy
of life could be recomposed in a higher unity; in this case, there is no explanation that
could properly account for what is objectively valid in the various philosophies of life.
Again, the difference between the two types of conflict depends upon the difference of
function performed by philosophical theories, on the one hand, and philosophy of life, on
the  other  hand.  While  the  former  have  a  truth-value,  the  latter  have  only  a
representative-value; while the former pretend to be true, the latter aim at articulating in
a satisfactory way – satisfactory for the people who hold a particular philosophy of life –
the direction in which a particular national genius is moving.  Accordingly,  while the
success of a philosophical theory is a consequence of its capacity to make sense of a
specific subject-matter, the success of a philosophy of life stems from its capacity to be
representative of a particular point of view. In other words, while the logic that governs
the conflict between philosophical theories is monistic, the logic that governs the conflict
between philosophies of life is intrinsically pluralistic.
14 The notion of philosophy of life posed a serious challenge to Dewey’s thought because it was
a sort of ‘borderline’ concept which cut across many of the functional distinctions that he
had so patiently drawn in his previous writings. What was particularly difficult for him to
formulate  was  the  immediacy of  the  connection  between thought  and  overt  activity.
Dewey had always insisted on the fact that theories and ideas suspend overt activity, that
they are logical elements insofar as they contribute to the deliberate reconstruction of a
new experience. For him, the essence of a theory was to be intermediate and mediating.
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Philosophies  of  life  do  not  operate  in  this  way;  rather,  they  influence  action  in  an
immediate,  direct and unreflective way. As Dewey wrote,  through education they get
embodied not in “men’s minds,” but rather “in their permanent dispositions of action”
(MW 8: 141). They somehow infiltrate into the “habits of imagination and behavior” of a
people, thus becoming part of their intellectual endowment.
15 If one focuses on the way in which philosophies of life operate, it is apparent that the
latter are more similar to suggestions than to logical ideas. However, they are different
from suggestions since a) they are highly refined and complex; b) they are valid not only
for a single individual, but for a community of people; c) they are general. The last point
is particularly relevant. Philosophies of life are general in the sense of being the horizons
which influence and somehow predetermine the plausibility that a people is driven to
acknowledge to different suggestions.  I  take this  to be the meaning of  the following
sentence: “in this way can we get a clue to those general ideas with which Germany
characteristically  prefers  to  connect  the aspirations and convictions that  animate its
deeds”  (MW 8:  147).  Here  it  seems  clear  that  Dewey  had  in  mind  something  like  a
Weltanschauung, a  general  conception  of  life  permeating  the  beliefs,  desires,  and
aspirations of a people. The main difference between the concept of Weltanschauung and
Dewey’s notion of philosophy of life is that the latter insists much more than the former
on the intrinsic connection between a theory and the material and political conditions of
the situation in which it originates. For Dewey, a philosophy of life is never a private
option, an existential choice, something that a person can freely and individually choose
to believe. Here as everywhere else, Dewey was highly suspicious of what was merely
private, merely individual. A philosophy of life is something which is capable of providing
a synthesis that could formulate “a sense of a national mission and destiny” (MW 8: 152). 
16 In German Philosophy and Politics Dewey never uses the word ideology; nonetheless, it does
not seem inappropriate to say that what he was trying to understand and describe in that
book was precisely the ideological function of theories. Indeed, to become a philosophy of
life, a general system of thought must be acknowledged by a group of people as their
“banner” and “conscious creed”; they have to recognize themselves in the values and
ideals  that  that  system of  thought  defend.  As  is  evident,  such  an  insistence  on  the
ideological  function  of  theories  has  strong  relativistic  consequences:  the  idea  that  a
philosophy of life supplies a people with “a sense of a national mission and destiny”
means that the cultural world in which a man is raised influences the way in which he
justifies his own beliefs. Different people holding different philosophies of life are guided
by different ideals,  different values,  different beliefs as well  as different standards of
justification. Different people live in the same world, obviously, but they do not speak the
same language (MW 10: 218).
17 Dewey  explored  the  relativistic  import  of  his  ‘new  philosophy’  in  the  article  “On
Understanding  The  Mind  of  Germany” (1916).  In  that  article, which  was  a  sort  of
continuation of German Philosophy and Politics, he discussed at length the problem of the
possibility of intercultural understanding. Dewey did not believe that the plurality of
philosophies of life supported a relativistic account of social life. He did not provide any
argument in favor of this view, but it is very likely that he thought that the relativistic
position was a too abstract description of the dynamics of intercultural interaction. In
order to show how the conflicts between different cultures actually originated and how
they  could  be  settled,  or  at  least  defused,  he  introduced  a  concept,  that  of  national
philosophies, which differs from the notion of philosophy of life only in that the former
What Does China Mean for Pragmatism?
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
6
puts more emphasis on the intrinsic connection between a system of thought and the
political  community to which it  refers.  National  philosophies,  he wrote,  are different
ways of articulating on a symbolic level the content that history had made “familiar and
congenial” to a people. “Each nation,” he remarked, “expresses its justification through
the ideas which its past history has made most intelligible to itself – in terms, that is, of
its national philosophy” (MW 10: 218-9).
18 By  relating  national  philosophies  to  national  histories,  Dewey  managed  to  found  a
concrete and positive ground on which to assess the problem of cultural relativism. He
argued that the differences between national philosophies stemmed from the differences
between national histories, which, in their turn, were influenced and transformed by the
actions undertaken under the guidance of the former. That meant that the intercultural
difference was not a brute fact, but rather the result of a long process of differentiation,
which became obnoxious only when, for strictly historical reasons, a people did not enter
in almost any relation with the others. That was the case of the Germans, for instance,
and that was the reason why English and Americans found the mind of Germans much
more difficult to penetrate than that of the French. So, the problem of relativism was not
that of confronting different and incommensurable worldviews, but that of providing the
conditions  for  entering  in  contact  and  becoming  acquainted  with  other  national
communities. In Dewey’s hands, a metaphysical problem was translated into a concrete,
empirically testable hypothesis that suggested concrete and empirical solutions. In doing
so, the relativistic implications of the existence of a plurality of philosophies of life – a
fact that the outbreak of the First World War had brought violently to the fore – were
substantially defused, and the description of the historical situation was made consistent
with his  overall  position.  A  problem was  turned into  a  fact:  the  menace  of  cultural
relativism was replaced by the acknowledgment that cultural pluralism was one of the
fundamental factors that any social philosophy had to take into account.
19 We can draw some conclusions from what has been said so far. Our starting point has
been the hypothesis that the First World War presented Dewey with some facts that were
not easily accounted for in his traditional instrumentalist framework. One of these facts
was the ideological function performed by general theories, and the harmful political and
social consequences that they could bring about. In order to account for this aspect of
contemporary societies, Dewey developed the notion of philosophy of life. This notion
enabled him to highlight the complexity of social reality: he conceived of philosophies of
life as elements of social life enhancing the richness and diversity of the interactions
among social agents. At the same time, that very notion compelled Dewey to take into
consideration the complexity of the ideal dimension of human behavior. The analysis of
the role played by Kantianism in German world made him aware that general theories
and systems of thought were not merely logical tools; they could perform also a different
function, which we have called ideological. Dewey did not openly discuss this issue, but it
is evident that the problem with which he was concerned was that of understanding the
ideological articulation produced by philosophies of life: the fundamental thesis of German
Philosophy and Politics was precisely that the success of a philosophy of life depends on its
capacity to articulate the forces at work in a specific community. This doctrine was in
continuity with his instrumentalist position, but it was not logically deducible from it.
Indeed, it relied on concepts that were not available to Dewey when he wrote the Studies
in Logical Theory, and which were deeply interwoven with the philosophical anthropology
that he was struggling to formulate – significantly, the lectures on which Human Nature
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and Conduct (1922) is based were delivered just a couple of years later, in 1918. As we will
see in the last section of this article, this broad conception of instrumentalism was the
theoretical  tool  that  allowed  Dewey  to  deal  with  a  puzzling  feature  of  the  Chinese
civilization.
 
3. Dewey at War: Thought, Emotion and the Power of
the Irrational
20 In the opening pages of German Philosophy and Politics Dewey raised the question of the
general validity of thought: the point at stake was that of understanding which kind of
practical consequences were brought about by philosophies of life, in the context of a
more general inquiry devoted to clarifying “the nature of the influence of general ideas
upon practical affairs” – which Dewey himself defined as “a troubled question” (MW 8:
139). The same problem was tackled at the beginning of the article “On Understanding
The  Mind  of  Germany” as  well  as  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  Lectures  in  China.  The
insistence with which Dewey discussed that issue in his writings can be taken as clear
evidence of the importance that he attached to it in that particular moment of his life. In
all  these texts,  he moved from the observation that the development of physical and
psychical sciences had made it more and more difficult to stick to the belief that reason
actually  controls  action.  We need to  believe  that  we are  “lords”  of  our  “intellectual
structures,”  that  we  are  creators  of  our  conceptual  structures,  he  argued,  but
unfortunately psychologists tell us that there are “vital instincts, obscure inclinations,
imperative preferences” which are “at work below the surface of consciousness” and
shape  our  “systems  of  belief”  (MW 10:  216).  Similarly,  the  development  of  physical
sciences has brought about a lack of confidence in the power of reason and thought: a
malicious interpretation of the results of physical sciences promotes the reduction of
mind to a “bare spectator of a machine-like nature.” Finally, the same conclusion has
been reached by the theorists of evolution, who “regard intelligence as a deposit from
history, not as a force in its making” (MW 8: 139).
21 All these episodes of distrust in reason are part of a much broader scenario which is
essentially coincident with the history of modernity.2 As Dewey lucidly noted, modernity
is prima facie paradoxical: in previous stages of civilization, when men had “least control
over  nature  and  their  own  affairs,”  they  were  nonetheless  pretty  confident  in  “the
efficacy  of  thought”  (MW  8:  139).  On  the  contrary,  in  modern  times  scientific  and
technological discoveries have made available a huge number of tools and techniques
which allow human beings to predict and control natural and social changes with a high
degree of reliability. However, the enhancement of predictive and controlling power has
gone hand in hand with an increasing perplexity about the force and efficacy of thought.
Dewey formulated the paradox in this way: “Yet just in the degree in which men, by
means  of  inventions  and  political  arrangements,  have  found  ways  of  making  their
thoughts effective, they have come to question whether any thinking is efficacious” (MW
8: 139). The fate of modernity is that of calling into question that very force that has
generated it – the force of thought. 
22 Dewey did not believe that what I have called ‘the paradox of modernity’ was genuine. In
the end, he wrote, “like the rest of us,” those who question the capacity of thought to
direct and control natural and social events “are human, and infected with a belief that
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ideas, even highly abstract theories, are of efficacy in the conduct of human affairs” (MW
8: 140). But he argued that the lack of confidence in the force of thought which lay behind
that paradox was a sign of something different and more profound, which had to do not
with the metaphysical constitution of reality, but with the logical conditions of thought.
23 In his early writing, Dewey had stressed that thinking is a fallible activity, grounded in no
metaphysical  or  ontological  warrant.  The  distinction  that  he  had  drawn  between  a
constructive  and  a  reconstructive  conception  of  thought  was  precisely  intended  to
emphasize the contingent and tentative character of every act of thought against those
views that tended toward an absolutization of reason. Dewey’s target were the upholders
of Anglo-American idealism, a tradition of thought to which he himself had been strongly
sympathetic:  the  distinction  between  thought  as  constructive  and  thought  as  re-
constructive paved the way for the wholesale rejection of Absolute idealism with which
Dewey inaugurated a new course of his thought.
24 During the war years Dewey came to realize not simply the fallibility of thought, but also
its fragility. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of his increased awareness of the
limits that beset the activity of thinking. In his early writings Dewey’s main concern was
to provide a sound criticism of the view that, in order to account for the meaningfulness
of  immediate  experience,  it  is  necessary to  postulate  a  constitutive  and unconscious
activity of an Absolute mind of which the reflective and controlled activity of a finite
mind is only a pale and powerless imitation. The problem now became that of arguing for
the very possibility of thought. In the first case, the idea of the fallibility of thought was a
means to save thought from the risk of its annihilation. In the second case, the feeling of
the fragility of thought was the very problem stated in its simplest and clearest terms.
25 It would not be difficult to show how relevant the idea of ‘limits of thought’ was for
Dewey’s philosophy. However, to offer a detailed reconstruction of this notion exceeds
the scope of the present paper. I  will  therefore use it  as an unproblematic and well-
grounded concept, postponing its clarification and justification to a future article. With
‘limits of thought’ I mean to highlight two fundamental assumptions of Dewey’s logical
instrumentalism: on the one hand, the idea that the act of thinking originates from a
problematic situation which sets the conditions for its valid application as a factor acting
to solve the problem; on the other hand, the thesis that the scope of the act of thinking is
restricted to the specific situation at stake.
26 These two assumptions were firstly formulated with clarity in the Studies in Logical Theory.
My thesis is that, as a consequence of his experience of the effects of the war on the
American society, Dewey subjected the idea of limits of thought to a substantial revision.
In many of the texts that he wrote during that period, Dewey pointed out that thought
could be limited in another additional way. He realized that the activity of thinking can
be limited by particularly hostile social conditions which hamper the use of intelligence
and experimentation. 
27 In the article “Conscription of Thought” Dewey lucidly explained what he felt was the
most threatening aspect of the state of war in which America was involved. Surprisingly
enough, he stated that he was not particularly worried about the widely spread tendency
to limit the liberty of thought and speech: the latter had been so severely menaced in the
past that there was no sound reason to doubt that it could survive this new attack. In his
eyes,  much  more  harmful  were  those  attacks  that  acted  obliquely.  Conscription  of
thought was an instance of the latter type in its most clearly marked form. In times of
war, Dewey remarked, a people looked for social cohesion and unity, and rewarded them
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over and above any other thing. Consequently, any opinion perceived as a threat to social
unity  was  banned.  This  happened  even  though  history  had  shown  the  complete
“inefficacy of the conscription of mind as a means of promoting social solidarity.” From
the point of view of its efficacy,  indeed,  conscription of thought was a self-defeating
strategy. Much better would have been to encourage public discussion, because through
the latter “unpopular ideas [...] burn themselves out or die of inanition,” while the “direct
suppression of thought” usually increases “the vitality of obnoxious beliefs” (MW 10: 277).
The problem with the social dangerousness of conscription of thought lied therefore not
in its intended consequences, but in the indirect and uncontrolled ones. Conscription of
mind was socially and politically dangerous since it ended by undermining freedom of
thought and speech by promoting absence of reflection and “apathy of intelligence” (MW
10: 279).
28 What Dewey had in mind was a sort of ‘transcendental’ criticism. His argument was that
rather than being concerned with the various, ‘positive’ attempts to limit the activity of
thought, one should be alert to those forces that aimed to transform the structure of the
society, and, in doing so, posed a serious threat to the very conditions of possibility of
thinking. According to Dewey, such forces were actually at work in American society. The
means through which they were trying to bring about these social transformations was
propaganda.
29 Dewey was concerned about the damages caused by propaganda. The events that took
place in America during the war years  made him aware that  the negative effects  of
propaganda concerned society as a whole, and not simply one of its factions. Indeed,
contrary to what was commonly believed, the real victims of propaganda were less those
whose  opinions  were  subjected  to censorship  than  the  censors  and  those  who
symphatized  with  them.  While  the  former  were  prompted  by  the  attack  they
continuously received to discuss and defend their own views, the latter tended to rest
satisfied with the beliefs that were accepted and sanctioned by Government and by the
silent majority of the population. Their answer to the challenges presented by different
opinions was to get rid of them: by calling them seditious and threatening, they defused
the  situation  of  intellectual  confrontation,  and  continued  to  follow  obediently  and
unreflectively the path of tradition.
30 Dewey was deeply impressed by the fact that the vast majority of the American society
was living in a condition of “hypersensitiveness of nerves,” as a consequence of which the
recourse to controlled thinking activity as a force to reconstruct problems was for them
no more a real possibility (MW 10: 276). “Emotional perturbations,” he wrote, “are so
deep  and  general  in  war  that  any  one  who  keeps  himself  outside  can  behold  the
suborning  of  intelligence  in  progress”:  the  outcome  of  those  perturbations  was  the
reinforcement of “native partisanship of thought and belief,” and a growing aversion
towards  “[i]mpartiality  and  detachment  of  mind”  (MW  10:  216).  By  observing  the
dramatic changes in America, Dewey realized that emotional stir had taken the place of
reflective  and controlled  reasoning.  A  people  longing  for  a  strong  sense  of  national
identity did not want to have the possibility to choose among different, competitive, and
equally  possible  courses  of  activity.  That  plenty  of  opportunities  was  perceived  as
disturbing and distressing. Rather, Americans wanted to have a clear set of beliefs to
hold, in the conviction that social and political unity could be attained only by outlawing
different  opinions.  In  times  of  war,  emotion became therefore  intelligence’s  greatest
enemy: “[f]or an emotion which sweeps all before it, so undivided as to leave room but for
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one  kind  of  thinking  and  one  form  of  belief,  affords  a  sweetly  complete  sense  of
certainty” (MW 10: 216).
31 It is important not to misunderstand the import of Dewey’s remarks on propaganda. In
his eyes, to acknowledge that a society becomes inhospitable to differences of opinions
and to free thinking when its citizens happen to become slave of emotions aroused by
propaganda was not merely a sociological analysis;  it  was first and foremost a logical
thesis which could account for an essential feature of that concrete human activity which
is reflective thinking – that is, the fact that the latter was a social activity that could be
hampered  and  distorted  by  an  uncontrolled  emotional  outburst  of  energies.  More
precisely,  Dewey’s  argument  was  not  intended to  prove  that  emotion could  actually
replace thought;  rather  the contrary,  it  aimed at  showing that,  in certain occasions,
propaganda could be strong enough to modify the logical endowment of  a  people by
perverting the relation between thought and emotion. In times of war, Dewey remarked,
emotion worked not by inhibiting thought in general, but, more subtly, by fostering “only
those ideas which support and reinforce their own operation”; in doing so, it ended by
producing “intellectual structures which effectively mask from view whatever trouble
action were it recognized” (MW 10: 217).
32 In Dewey’s eyes, the main effect of propaganda had been that of making most of the
Americans intellectually blind, as a consequence of which they had lost their capacity to
undertake  inquiries.  They  continued to  make  use  of  general  ideas  and theories,  but
instead of using them in a logical way, they used them ideologically. As Dewey remarked,
men always need a justification for what they are doing: “[m]en are profoundly moral
even  in  their  immoralities”;  they  cannot  act  without  a  moral  justification  of  their
decisions (MW 10: 217). The name that Dewey gave to this process of justification was
‘idealization’:  through idealization,  he  remarked,  people  found a  way to  justify  their
beliefs without having to submit the latter to a process of rational evaluation.3 The ‘logic’
of idealization acted by severing the relations that hold together means and ends: ends
and  values  were  estimated  more  than  specific  purposes;  “the  nurture  of  personal
motives” was privileged over “the creation of social agencies and environments” (MW 10:
262). Dewey seemed here to suggest that idealization was a sort of negative counterpart
of  rational  investigation,  characterized  by  its  own  distinctive  logic,  whose  aim  was
precisely to undermine the very possibility of an intelligent treatment of social problems.
33 At that stage, Dewey did not use ‘public’ as a technical term; however, one promising way
to clarify  the  difference between idealization and controlled inquiry  in  social  affairs
would be to say that the latter generates the public,  while the former generates the
masses. While the rise of the public originates from the conscious perception of the public
consequences of a certain act, the rise of the masses in politics is a direct effect of the
increasing complexity of social life,  of the enormous quantity of energies released by
dramatic events of contemporary life such as the First World War. Consequently, from a
theoretical point of view, it can be said that the genesis of the public depends on the
capacity of a society to prevent its people to become a mass. As is well known, a complete
theory of the public was formulated by Dewey only in The Public and its Problems (1927), as
an answer to the problems raised by Lippman. Almost nothing of this sort could be found
in  the  texts  that  Dewey  wrote  in  the  war  years.  However,  in  these  texts  he  did  a
preliminary  work  aimed  at  discovering  what  may  be  called  the  conditions  of
‘perturbation’ of public reason. Such a preliminary work – which was mainly negative,
since it was directed to highlighting the ‘pathology’ of public – was very likely the most
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difficult part of the project. Indeed, it compelled Dewey to go against the grain of his
philosophy, focusing not on the positive, reconstructive function of thought, but rather
on its intrinsic powerlessness.
 
4. Dewey in China: Managing Cultural Differences
34 It should be evident from what has been said until now that when the First World War
eventually came to an end, Dewey’s philosophy was dramatically different not only from
the representation that Bourne had given of it two years before in the Twilight of Idols, but
also from the shape that it had before the outbreak of the war. It was now richer, more
concrete, less abstract and less schematic. It was more attentive to the social conditioning
of thought as well as to the possible relativistic implications of such conditioning. It was
undoubtedly less optimistic: on the one hand, the progressive refinement of the logical
analysis had led Dewey to acknowledge the limits of the activity of thinking as well as the
consequent problems that the latter pose to the theory and practice of education; on the
other  hand,  the  irrational  forces  released  by  the  war,  in  internal  as  well  as  in
international  affairs,  made  him aware  that  the  process  of  rational  reconstruction of
society was much more difficult and troublesome than he had previously realized. Finally,
it  was more ‘prometheic’  and more ambitious:  if  the assessment of the difficulties in
which thinking is involved dispels easy optimism, it also stimulates human activity to
tackle social problems with a renewed confidence in the capacity of the intellectual tools
to account for the complexity of reality.
35 So, when Dewey finally arrived in China after a brief and far less productive stay in Japan,
he had behind himself a concrete attempt – which had been lasting for a period of almost
five years – to understand the complexity of social reality in all its many forms. Thanks to
that  preliminary work,  he was lucidly aware – probably more aware than any other
American  philosopher  of  his  time  –  that  a  great  part  of  what  was  going  on  in
contemporary societies was influenced by philosophies of life. His sojourn in China gave
him the opportunity to put his theoretical assumptions to a far more trying test.4 Indeed,
the object to be analyzed and understood was not simply a society completely different
from America and Europe, but a world that was engaged in a ground-shaking revolution. 
36 Dewey and his wife,  Alice,  arrived in China on May,  1st,  1919,  three days before the
outbreak of the Fourth May Movement. Their first impression of China was registered by
Alice in a letter to her children, dated May, 3. Coming to China from Japan, Alice wrote,
she had experienced a feeling of freedom and liberation from a world in which social life
was completely controlled and regulated by fixed rules of behavior (Letter, A. Chipman
Dewey to her Children, May 3, 1919). Dewey agreed with his wife’s remark. In an article
published few months later,  he noticed that,  even though it  was a  “three days  easy
journey from Japan to China,” “[i]t is doubtful whether anywhere in the world another
journey of the same length brings with it such a complete change of political temper and
belief” (MW 11: 174). In a letter to his children, dated May, 9, he stressed the differences
between the two nations by saying that while Japan was “baffling and tantalizing,” China
was “overpowering” (Letter, J. Dewey to his Children, May 9, 1919). In another letter he
wrote that the feeling that he was “going to see more of the dangerous side of life” was
more than welcomed (Letter, J. Dewey to his Children, May 3, 1919). Dewey could not
suffer the “feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japan itself”: he disliked the sense
of doubleness that characterized Japanese society, the distinction drawn between internal
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and external, the desire to preserve the society unmodified (MW 11: 176; see also Letter, J.
Dewey  to  A.  Barnes,  September  15,  1919).  He  needed  something  more  concrete  and
genuine; he needed to get in touch with a living and troublesome reality. 
37 No surprise  therefore  that  Dewey was  truly  impressed and somehow excited  by  the
Chinese situation. The obstacles that Chinese had to overcome were momentous: indeed,
the problem at stake was not simply the modernization of China, but the preservation of
its very existence against Japanese interference. At the Paris Peace Conference it had
been  decided  that  the  German  concessions  in  China  should  be  transferred  to  Japan
instead of being reverted to Chinese sovereignty. In doing so, the Western powers – with
the  remarkable  exception  of  the  United  States  – were  implicitly  supporting  Japan’s
imperialist politics in China, thus hindering the formation of a Chinese national state. The
consequence of that decision was a mass protest – the so-called Fourth May Movement –
which began with a student demonstration against the Chinese government, criticized for
accepting the decision of the Western powers to give the Shandong province to Japan. In
the very same letter in which he highlighted the differences between China and Japan,
Dewey told his children about his views on what was going on in the country. He wrote: 
[t]he other day the Peking univ students started a parade in protest of the Paris
Peace  Conference  action  in  turning  the  German  interests  in  China  over  to  the
Japanese. Being interfered with by the police they got more unruly and beat up the
Chinese  minister  to  Japan  who  negotiated  the  treaties that  sold  China  out,  he
having been bribed; they burned the house where he was staying, and he went to
the  hospital,  in  fact  was  reported  dead.  Well,  in  one  sense  this  was  a  kind  of
Halloween students spree with a somewhat serious political purpose attached. In
another sense, it may be – tho probably not – the beginning of an important active
political movement, out of which anything may grow. (J.  Dewey to his Children,
May 9, 1919)
38 Over  time  Dewey  become  more  and  more  enthusiastic  about  the  possibility  of  a
revolution that could transform Chinese society. He sided with the students; he supported
the boycott of the merchants; he felt that what was happening was a raising of public
opinion. It is easy to see why Dewey was so excited by the opportunity to get involved in
the Fourth May Movement: pure chance had put him at the very center of an epoch-
making event; he was not simply in the position of observing and commenting on facts;
he was part of them, and he could legitimately hope to be a factor influencing them. What
was going on in China was nothing less than “the transformation of the mind of China”:
“the realm problem of the Pacific,” Dewey observed, “is the problem of transformation of
the mind of China, of the capacity of the oldest and most complicated civilization of the
globe to  remake itself  into the new forms required by the impact  of  immense alien
forces”  (MW  11:  206).  Dewey  realized  that  the  Fourth  May  Movement  was  a  major
occasion to test his idea of social philosophy, and, at the same time, to actively intervene
in the course of events. As he himself remarked in one of his earlier articles on China,
“[t]o the eye of the mind [China] presents the most enthralling drama now anywhere
enacting” (MW 11: 214; see also MW 12: 41, and MW 13: 94). 
39 At the same time, however, Dewey clearly perceived that China was different from almost
everything that he had had experience of in his life. In one occasion, Dewey spoke of
“[t]he baffling and ‘mysterious’ character of China to the West” (MW 11: 209). Even time
seemed to run differently in China: “the foreigner interpreter,” he wrote in a sort of
autobiographical mood, “comes to the scene with a mind adapted to the quick tempo of
the West,” but then she will soon realize that she is not “used to history enacted on the
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scale of that of China” (MW 11: 205). China has a history of four thousand years, Dewey
remarked, so it is impossible that it could find “new courses” of action in a short span of
time. The process of absorption and appropriation of Western knowledge needed much
time and efforts to be completed. The main difficulty for a Westerner was precisely due to
the fact that China was an evolving civilization which was not willing to adopt “western
external methods for immediate practical ends”: as Dewey observed, “the Chinese genius
does not lie in that direction” (MW 11: 207). But this meant that even those concepts that
lied at the basis of Western political and social philosophy – as, for instance, the concept
of  State  to  which  Dewey  had  devoted  considerable  attention  in  his  Reconstruction  of
Philosophy – were not reliable tools for understanding the Chinese situation: “[n]either
our political  science nor our history,”  he bitterly remarked,  “supplies  any system of
classification  for  understanding  the  most  characteristic  phenomena  of  Chinese
institutions” (MW 11: 210). 
40 As usual in Dewey, the difficulty to cope with a different reality turned out to be a logical
problem – that of the reliability of the Western categories of thought. He did not take
much time to realize that his conceptual framework did not fit very well to the Chinese
situation, and that in order to properly understand the latter he had to strip off most of
his habits of thought.5 Accordingly, he adopted the attitude of a cultural anthropologist.
Keeping faithful  to his instrumentalist  approach,  however,  he tried not only and not
simply to describe the main differences between the two cultures; he also attempted to
explain the reasons why Chinese mentality had taken its characteristic shape. 
41 In particular, Dewey was deeply surprised by a specific trait of Chinese mentality. “The
Chinese,” he remarked, “talk more easily than they act – especially in politics [...]. One of
the defects upon which they dwell is the love of finding substitutes for positive action, of
avoiding entering upon a course of action which might be irrevocable.” (MW 11: 176).
Their motto could be formulated as follows: “If things are fairly well off, then let well
enough alone. If they are evil, endure them rather than run the risk of making them
worse by interference.” (MW 12: 54).  In the article “As the Chinese think,” originally
published in 1922 and then reprinted in Characters and Events with the significant title
(chosen by Joseph Ratner and approved by Dewey) “The Chinese Philosophy of Life,”
Dewey rhetorically asked: “Why are the Chinese so unperturbed […] Is their attitude one
of callous indifference, of stupid ignorance?” And then he added: “Is her [of China] course
stupid inertia, a dull obstinate clinging to the old just because it is old? Or does it show
something more profound,  a wise,  even if  largely unconscious,  aversion to admitting
forces that are hostile to the whole spirit of her civilization.” (MW 13: 221). In a letter to
Barnes, he noticed that there were many things in China that made him believe that the
“future [was] with China”; nonetheless, the Chinese did not seem interested in “bring
[ing] in that future.” “The puzzle of their contrasting strong and weak sides,” he wrote,
“is one of the most fascinating things I[’]ve ever experienced, and keeps one always on
the alert to see what is coming next […]. It is a fascinating game to watch, but hard to
repress one desire for a [little] more d[i]rect western energy to tackle things before they
get to the top[p]ling over point.” (Letter, J. Dewey to A. Barnes, September 15, 1919; see
also Wang 2007: 75ff.). 
42 As should be evident, the Chinese tendency towards inaction posed a powerful challenge
to Dewey’s thought: one of the pillars of his philosophy was the idea that inquiry has a
temporal structure, that it is an intermediate stage of experience, and that an intelligent
action is that which control the course of the events by assessing the means to achieve a
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certain  end.  Now,  Dewey  found  himself  confronted  with  a  culture  that  was  greatly
suspicious of any active intervention in the course of events, that did not praise at all
private initiative and personal  responsibility,  that was not confident in the power of
intelligence.  It  seemed  that,  in  China,  the  rational  assessment  of  successful  lines  of
behavior was actually replaced with a sort of passive attitude suggesting that the only
wise thing to do was to wait for the unfolding of the events. In addition, Chinese culture
did not believe that reflection could yield positive results in the field of politics – at least,
if politics is conceived of as centering on the notion of Government. Since in those years
Dewey was struggling to develop a consistent social philosophy, the empirical fact of a
people utterly opposed to the very idea of social  reform was something theoretically
disturbing and problematic.
43 In other words, it seemed that Chinese civilization had developed a conception of reason
which was  at  odds  with Dewey’s  instrumentalism.  The difficulty  of  the problem was
enhanced by the fact that Dewey could not resort to any version of the idea of primitive
mind in order to account for the Chinese ‘logical difference.’6 Indeed, his deep respect for
the Chinese civilization did not allow him to think of it as undeveloped or less developed
than the European culture: “no one who knows the Chinese,” he wrote, “can believe that
the  difficulty  is  intellectual,  that  the  people  have  not  the  mental  gifts required  in
successful organization” (MW 12: 51). He often spoke of China as “the oldest and most
complicated civilization of the globe”; it was clear to him that Chinese achievements in
the fields of art and philosophy were not inferior to those reached by America or any
other country in the world (MW 11: 206; see also MW 13: 93). At the very same time,
Dewey did not believe that such a difference could be explained by postulating an alleged
essential  character  that  somehow marked all  the  products  of  Chinese  civilization  as
different  from those  of  the  other  cultures.  He  was  never  fascinated by  that  kind of
metaphysical explanations that Oswald Spengler made so popular in his Decline of the West.
44 Dewey  argued  therefore  that  the  Chinese  civilization  was  the  outcome  of  particular
choices taken in the past – he significantly devoted great attention to the teachings of
Laotze and Confucius;  even in the Lectures  in China there is  evidence of  that interest
(Dewey 2015:  I)  –  in  order  to  cope  with problems that  were  specific  to  the  Chinese
situation.  As  he  wrote  in  “Chinese  National  Sentiment,”  referring  to  the traditional
Western way of dealing with political questions, Europeans and Americans tend to take
the European development “as a necessary standard of normal political evolution”: “[w]e
have made ourselves believe that all  development from savagery to civilization must
follow a like course and pass through similar stage” (MW 11: 215). Dewey was well aware
that such an attitude was not only immodest and unjustified, but also harmful in that it
prevented the understanding of the history of China as well as of its future course. The
starting point of every possible analysis should be, therefore, the recognition that China
had its own line of development, and that the latter was the only legitimate criterion for
evaluating and predicting the behavior of the Chinese people. Consequently, he suggested
that Chinese civilization should be interpreted “only in terms of the institutions and ideas
which have been worked out in its own historical evolution” (MW 11: 216). “We can get
the key to mental operations,” Dewey remarked, “only by studying social antecedents and
environment […]. We have to understand beliefs and traditions to understand acts, and
we have to understand historic institutions to understand beliefs.” (MW 11: 210).
45 As is evident, the functional socio-anthropological approach that Dewey advocated was in
strong continuity with his broad instrumentalist account of theories and philosophies of
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life  since  it  relied  on  the  assumption  that  the  latter  should  be  treated  as  essential
elements of social reality.7 What is interesting in this case is that the nature and size of
the differences between Chinese and Western civilizations led him to broaden the scope
of his analysis to include geographical and economical considerations, and, in doing so, to
revise  and improve  his  account  of  the  ideological  function of  ideas.  Both in  German
Philosophy  and  Politics  and  in  “On  Understanding  the  Mind of  Germany”  Dewey  had
focused his attention on the problem of the justification of a line of conduct which, even
though it was perceived as stemming from a body of beliefs (a mentality) different from
that of the other Western countries,  could be easily accommodated within a broader
conceptual  framework.  In  the  end,  Germans’  activities  were  firstly  directed  toward
achieving national unity, and then toward fostering the economic, social and military
progress of Germany. These goal could hardly be said to be idiosyncratic because,  in
different degrees and in different ways, they were shared by all the European powers.
46 Dewey’s description of the differences between the various national philosophies of life
revolved around the metaphor of a plurality of languages, each of which represented the
way in which a nation expressed “its own moral grounds in the terms which its history
[had] made familiar and congenial” (MW 10: 218). In the case of China that approach did
not seem very promising. On the one hand, the traditional seclusion of China was a well-
known fact – actually, it was the problem at stake – so that no real explanatory advantage
could be gained by simply re-stating it. On the other hand, the ‘Chinese difference’ was so
great that it was not possible to presuppose a shared set of beliefs or values that could
provide a sort of general horizon of interpretation, in the light of which the various
national histories could be understood and compared. The problem was precisely that
such a horizon did not seem to exist – or, at least, it did not seem easy to discover it.
47 Consequently, it was not enough to appeal to the national history of China to account for
the specific traits of Chinese mentality. Dewey realized that historical reconstruction did
not  have  enough  explanatory  power,  but  had  to  be  backed  and  supported  by
considerations of other kind. A much more radical approach was needed. In order to
account for the ‘Chinese difference’ – the fact that Chinese did not seem to conceive of
rationality in instrumentalist terms, as the search for the means by which to control the
future course of events (or at least that they were not willing to adopt it as a method to
solve their own problems) – he had to take a step further towards the elaboration of a
theory of logic that could highlight the concrete, material factors on which the activity of
thinking depends.
48 Dewey argued that the key to solve this puzzle was to acknowledge the full complexity of
the context in which philosophies of life had originated as well as the problems that they
were asked to face. He reasoned as follows. Despite all the differences in their national
histories, Western countries are very similar in their environmental conditions. To put it
rather simply:  in the European countries and in America human beings have enough
room to live together without hurting each other. The environmental conditions promote
the  development  of  personal  initiative,  and  foster  the  adoption  of  an  experimental
attitude towards social problems. On the contrary, China presents a completely different
scenario. It should not be overlooked, Dewey remarked, that its “extraordinary and long-
continued density of populations” is not simply a brute geographical and demographic
fact; it is first and foremost an important structural factor whose effects had an enormous
cultural impact (MW 12: 53). Historically, that situation of overpopulation had been the
background condition that any Chinese attempt to formulate a new course of action had
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to take into account. Consequently, Dewey concluded, it is not particularly strange that
the philosophy of life resulting from a confrontation with an environment so different
from the one with which Europeans and Americans are acquainted is marked by specific
and distinctive traits that have no comparable equivalents in any other country in the
world.
49 Dewey’s  analysis  is  extremely  sophisticated  on  this  point.  Thanks  to  his  previous
reflections on the social effects of propaganda, he was not uncomfortable with the idea
that the activity of thinking could be conditioned by the concrete social circumstances in
which the agent happens to find himself. He therefore used some of the principles lying
at the basis of the notion of “psychology of crowd” to account for the diffidence of the
Chinese towards initiative and experimentation. It is worth remarking, indeed, that one
of the problems that the psychology of crowd was meant to solve was the irrational
behavior  of  people  when in  large  numbers,  their  incapacity  to  adopt  a  rational  and
reflective attitude on social matters when participating in a strike or manifestation. In
the case of China, Dewey noticed, the situation was even more complicated because that
condition was not an episodic event, but a standard fact of associated living. As he wrote,
the psychologists who invented the mob-psychology “have not inquired as to the effect
upon the mind of constant living in close contact with large numbers, of continual living
in a crowd” (MW 12: 53).
It was on the basis of these assumptions that Dewey could eventually explain away the
‘Chinese difference.’ He moved from the assumption that any course of action human
beings undertake – and logical investigation should be conceived of as a particular way of
behaving in presence of other people – is dependent upon the environment with which
they have to cope. Now, because of overpopulation in China there was no possibility of
“solitude and loneliness”: every act was a public act, every behavior was subjected to
social  approval or disapproval.  There was “no room to stir about,  no relief  from the
unremitting  surveillance  of  their  fellows”  (MW 12:  53).  Every  person was  constantly
judged  by  the  other  persons  who  had  a  direct  interest  in  the  consequences  of  his
activities:  Chinese  acquired  “the  fear  that  if  one  strand  is  touched,  the  whole  will
unravel,” and accordingly they came to believe that “the safe thing [was] to leave things
alone” (MW 12: 54). Consequently, the virtue of free and responsible initiative was quite
naturally replaced by the attention to the “face,” to public reputation, to the opinion of
the others. “Imagine all elbow-room done away with, imagine millions of men living day
by day, year by year, in the presence of the same persons (a very close presence at that),”
Dewey remarked; if you could imagine that condition, “new light may be shed upon the
conservatism of the Chinese people” (MW 12: 53).
50 Conservatism was then the source of  the Chinese distrust  in the power of  reason to
control and redirect the course of events. But Dewey never tired of stressing that Chinese
conservatism was substantially different from the Western one. Chinese conservatism
hinged upon the idea of the superiority of nature over man, the “laissez-faire reverence for
nature,” the doctrine that the world is not at our disposal (MW 13: 222). To clarify this
point and to better highlight the differences between the Chinese and the Western form
of conservatism, Dewey used the example of the belief in Feng-shui – that is, the belief in
the existence of “mystical influences connected with the land” (MW 13: 224). That belief,
which was an essential part of the Chinese philosophy of life as codified in the teachings
of  Laotze  and  Confucius,  played  a  major  role  in  obstructing  and  retarding  the
introduction of new industrial forces in China. From a Western perspective, the belief in
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Feng-shui was  a  cultural  force  opposing  to  the  industrial  forces  aiming  at  the
modernization  and  rationalization  of  China.  It  impeded  the  economic  and  political
development of the country, its transformation in a modern nation with a strong central
government and an economy based on industry and free market. However, in the broader
context of the Chinese civilization that belief acquired a much more positive meaning:
indeed, it represented an appeal to the conservation of natural forces, “a remarkable
exhibition  of  piety  toward  nature,”  a  warning  against  the  risks  of  an  uncontrolled
exploitation of natural resources. If that belief were rationalized, Dewey remarked, “one
would see in it a belief that the land and its energies belong to the whole succession of
human beings, past generations and future” (MW 13: 224).
51 Against  the Western emphasis  on creativity and initiative,  regardless  of  any possible
future consequences on the environment, the Chinese civilization advanced a different
conception of  life and nature,  much more respectful  of  the soil  and its  fertility.  The
ultimate  reason  of  the  ‘Chinese  difference’  relied  precisely  here,  on  the  fact  that,
traditionally,  China was  “agrarian,  agricultural”;  and the  success  of  the  teachings  of
Laotze  should  be  traced  back  to  their  capacity  to  express  “something  congenial  to
Chinese temperament and habits of life.” Among all the people, he wrote, Chinese were
the only ones who succeeded in not exhausthing their soil: “the Chinese have gone on
tilling, tilling, tilling, even, as in north China, against great odds; and their soil is still
productive, as productive, probably, as ever it was” (MW 13: 222).
52 Consequently, Dewey held conservatism to be a positive value of Chinese civilization – in
a twofold sense.  On the one hand,  it  was positive in a functional,  articulative sense:
conservatism was an apt response to the particular environmental conditions with which
Chinese  had  been  confronted  for  thousands  of  years.  It  stemmed  from the  need  to
preserve what was most precious for them – the resources of nature. With a remarkable
image, Dewey said that “[t]heir minds are as steeped in contact with natural processes as
their bodies are apt for agricultural work” (MW 13: 222). It was natural for them to “wait
for the fruition of slow natural processes,” to give nature the “time to do her work”
(MW 13: 223, and MW 13: 222). And, similarly, it was natural for them to believe that
”[t]he workings of nature will in time bring to naught the artificial fussings and fumings
of man,” their motto being “[c]onquering by yielding” (MW 13: 222). On the other hand, it
was positive in the moral sense of the term: indeed, it  represented a different set of
values, contrary and alternative to the Western worldview, and nonetheless worthy of
preserving. As Dewey explicitly remarked, “the Chinese philosophy of life embodies a
profoundly  valuable  contribution  to  human  culture  and  one  of  which  a  hurried,
impatient, over-busied and anxious West is infinitely in need” (MW 13: 223).
53 As  should  be  evident,  the  overall  tone  of  Dewey’s  philosophy  as  well  as  its  specific
doctrines were substantially different from the ones formulated in his previous writings:
his attempt to come to terms with the ‘Chinese difference’ prompted him to radicalize his
thought in a direction that led him to formulate in a more inclusive and holistic way the
relation between nature and culture. In order to account for Chinese conservatism he had
to admit that theories and ideas – the realm to which philosophies of life belong – were
sensitive  to  the  natural,  environmental  conditions  in  which  they  originated,  such
conditions being a major component of what a philosophy of life had to articulate. In
doing so, he came to see that cultural choices were responsive to the ‘natural’ traits of the
situation, while, at the very same time, the latter found their proper realization in the
civilization whose development and evolution they directly supported or hindered: “[t]he
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teachings of Laotze,” he remarked, “spring from the depths of Chinese life and in turn
they have influenced that life” (MW 13: 223). A civilization thus became a self-included
whole – a sort of cultural organism – in which cultural aspects (philosophies of life) and
natural aspects (environmental conditions) were so closely interwoven that they were
impossible to disentangle.
54 The realization of the intertwining of nature and culture was consistent with Dewey’s
overall philosophical project, and in particular with the philosophical anthropology that
he sketched in the series of lectures published in 1922 as Human Nature and Conduct, based
on the notions of natural, unarticulated instincts and culturally mediated habits.8 It did
not represent, therefore, a theoretical novelty: it was more a matter of different emphasis
than of different meaning. However, the introduction of this new conceptual tool within
the context of Dewey’s thought had some important bearing upon his social philosophy.
First of all, it paved the way for a naturalized, anti-reductionist account of the notion of
philosophy of life, and, more in general, of the ideal dimension of human behavior: in his
articles on China, Dewey was willing to treat philosophies of life as natural events that
had to be discussed and dealt with in a purely naturalistic and experimental way, without
denying their autonomy as ideological products. It also implied that a social philosophy
which aimed to  provide  an account  of  social  reality  should  become more  and more
empirical and concrete,  more terrestrial  and attentive to the material  background of
theories. As a consequence, the notion of philosophy of life became a richer and more
powerful tool of analysis, which could enlarge the explanatory power of his pragmatist
social philosophy grounded on the notion of ideological articulation.
55 Two  were  the  main  theoretical  consequences  that  followed  from  such  a  change  of
perspective. The first one was the idea of the ‘humility of thought,’ which could be read as
a sort of radicalization of the notion of ‘limits of thought.’ We saw above that Dewey’s
analysis  of  the  harmful  effect  of  propaganda  on  American  society  was  intended  to
highlight  the ‘pathologies’  that  could affect  thought. In that  case,  the reconstructive
activity  of  thinking  was  conceived  of  as  a  value  to  preserve  against  the  menace  of
irrational forces at work in the contemporary world. To put it roughly, Dewey believed
that  the activity  of  thinking was  intrinsically  good,  and the preservation of  its  very
possibility was an end to attain. Dewey’s reflections on the ‘Chinese difference’ partially
modified  this  view,  which  was  too  simplistic.  It  is  not  that  Dewey  rejected  the
instrumentalist  tenet  that rationality  is  the  means-ends  evaluation,  with  the  aim of
controlling a future course of action. This would be probably a too strong statement, even
though it is possible to find some quotations that support such interpretation.9 Rather, he
became suspicious of the too naïve belief in the neutrality and unproblematic character
of  the  recourse  to  thinking  activity.  In  China,  he  remarked,  “[i]nnovation,
experimentation,  get  automatically  discouraged,  not  from  lack  of  intelligence,  but
because intelligence is too keenly aware of the mistakes that may result, the trouble that
may  arise”  (MW  12:  58).  The  philosophical  contribution  of  the  Chinese  civilization
amounted precisely to this – to call attention to an aspect which had gone completely
neglected in Western culture. That is, that in certain particular situations even our most
precious and successful tools could turn into a menace for ourselves and other people.
56 The second theoretical achievement was the idea of the cultural contingency of thought.
In his previous writings Dewey had always treated logical activity as a sort of universal
constant, even in those cases in which he was concerned with its social pathologies. That
he was strongly committed to the belief in the ‘universal validity’ of thought (as codified
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by Western civilization) is shown by the fact that when he first tried to advance some
proposals  on how to  solve  the problems of  China,  he  relied on the assumption that
Western method and knowledge could provide a reliable means to reach the ends that
Chinese wanted to  achieve,  even though that  assumption led him to completely  anti-
pragmatist conclusions – such as, for instance, the view that means could be given before
and independently from the end that they were supposed to bring about, and the end
could be, in its turn, determined without taking into account the means available to the
agents. So, for instance, in the article “What Holds China Back,” published in May 1920,
he argued that the only way to change how Chinese thought, acted and felt was not “by
expostulation, exhortation and preaching.” That would have amounted to a complete
misunderstanding of how deeply was that mentality rooted in the material conditions
with which Chinese civilization had to cope, and of how ingrained was it in the habits of
behavior of the Chinese people. Rather, he suggested that what was needed was a “change
of  conditions,  an  alteration  of  environment,”  and  that  “an  introduction  of  modern
industrial methods” was the only thing that could “profoundly affect the environment”
(MW  12:  59).  Now,  from  a  certain  point  of  view,  Dewey’s  proposal  was  genuinely
pragmatist since it acknowledged that the ideal dimension of human activity could not be
severed from the material in which it happens to be embodied. As Dewey wrote in the
Lectures  in China,  “[i]deas,  theories  are originally  products,  causes  of  non-intellectual  forces”
(Dewey 2015: I.3). However, by recommending the application of Western tools to solve
Chinese problems, he implicitly admitted that, no matter what was the problem, it could
be handled by Western means. But this was not a conclusion that Dewey could accept
without reservation and embarrassment.
57 One would be willing to say that this tension within Dewey’s philosophy was due to the
fact that the different strands of his thinking did not develop in parallel: at the time he
wrote “What Holds China Back,” Dewey was well aware that philosophies of life had to be
treated  as  natural  events,  but  he  did  not  succeeded  in  drawing  all  the  possible
conclusions from that thesis. As a consequence, his logical account of thinking was not
consistent with his naturalism. Two years later, when he wrote “As the Chinese Think,”
his  position  was  much  more  consistent.  In  the  context  of  a  discussion  of  Chinese
conservatism, Dewey drew a comparison between the Western and the Chinese mentality.
He wrote: “[w]hile western peoples have attacked, exploited and in the end wasted the
soil,  they [the Chinese] have conserved it.” And then he concluded: “[t]he results are
engraved upon both Chinese and western psychologies” (MW 13: 223). No pride of place
was given to Western civilization. The analysis contained in that article shows that he had
now realized that the logical activity of thinking, Western technology, the whole body of
Western knowledge, were all  part of a civilization which was not less grounded on a
particular philosophy of life than the Chinese one.
58 Dewey’s attempt to come to terms with the ‘Chinese difference’ resulted therefore in a
philosophical  position  which  was  radically  pluralist,  anti-foundationalist,  and  which
nonetheless did never indulge in the quietism to which relativism inevitably leads. His
eye was now trained to perceive the different layers that made up social  reality.  His
confrontation with the Chinese civilization reminded him of something which he had to
know very well, that is, that much of what we are ready to assume to be natural is, in
reality, second nature.
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5. Conclusion
59 After a twenty-six month stay in China, Dewey eventually went back to the United States
in October 1921. He returned to his previous job; he was again a professor of philosophy
after two years in which he had “no philosophical reading at all” (Letter, J. Dewey to F. C.
S. Schiller, July 18, 1922). Occasionally, he wrote some articles on China, but his attention
was captured by other concerns. The remaining part of the third decade of the century
was devoted to developing a naturalistic metaphysics: the problem of accounting for the
relation  between  ideal  and  real  was  replaced  by  the  problem  of  understanding  the
relation between nature and meaning, between naturalism and humanism. The aim of a
future research will  be to determine how much of the theoretical  achievements that
Dewey had reached in the period 1915-1921 passed into the new phase of his philosophy,
and too evaluate if something that did not receive adequate recognition in this new phase
could be preserved and revitalized in the contemporary philosophical debate.
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NOTES
1. The number of secondary literature about this subject is so extensive that it is impossible to
give a comprehensive bibliography. Two very interesting approaches are however provided by
Stuhr (2015, Chapter 7), and Livingston 2003.
2. Dewey’s conception of modernity is an unexplored issue. To my knowledge, the only attempt
to  thematize  this  problem,  which  is  fundamental  to  understanding  Dewey’s  philosophy,  is
Koopman 2010.
3. From  this  point  of  view  it  is  relevant  what  Dewey  wrote  in  his article  “Conscience  and
Compulsion” (1917): “One of my most depressing experiences in connection with this matter was
the number of young men who when war was actually declared merely clumsily rolled their
conscience  out  from  under  the  imperative  of  ‘Thou  shalt  not  kill’  till  it  settled  under  the
imperative of ‘Obey the law’ although they still  saw the situation exactly as they had seen it
before” (MW 10: 263).
4. For a similar reading, even if more concerned with Dewey’s political philosophy, see Wang
(2007: 65ff). For a discussion of the philosophical significance of Dewey’s visit in Japan, see Saito
2011 and 2012.
5. See, for instance, Letter, J. Dewey to H. W. Schneider, January 3, 1921; quoted in (Wang 2007:
75).
6. On  this  point,  see  Fallace  2011.  In  his  book  Dewey  and  the  Dilemma  of  Race, Fallace  has
convincingly  shown that  by  1916 Dewey started criticizing  the  traditional  evolutionary  view
(which he himself  had previously adopted) according to which native and primitive societies
should be conceived of as earlier and less developed stages of civilization that our “modern,
civilized culture had moved beyond” (Fallace 2011: 3-4; see in particular MW 2: 39-52). Dewey
came to realize that the relation between civilized cultures and ‘primitive’ ones could not be
explained in  terms of  lower  and higher  levels  of  growth within  a  linear  process  of  cultural
development,  but rather in terms of different realizations of a set of natural instincts which
constitute our biological endowment.
7. In the article “As the Chinese think,” Dewey did not hesitate to say that even the economic
factors should be conceived of as subordinated to cultural factors. This was an explicit rejection
of the Marxist thesis of the determinant character of the economy. Contrary to that tradition,
which assumed that “the causes of all difficulties between nations [were] economic,” he rebutted
that “the friction generated by economic competition and conflict would not break out into the
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flames  of  war  if  atmospheric  conditions  were  not  favorable.”  And  then  he  concluded  by
remarking  that  the  origin  of  social  conflict  was  intrinsically  moral  and  intellectual:  “[t]he
atmosphere  that  makes  international  troubles  inflammable  is  the  product  of  deep-seated
misunderstandings that have their origin in different philosophies of life” (MW 13: 218). 
8. On this point, see Torres Colon & Hobbs 2015.
9. See, for instance, (MW 13: 221).
ABSTRACTS
This  paper  aims to  investigate  the transformations  undergone by Dewey’s  philosophy in the
period from 1916 to 1921. By analyzing three different problematic situations with which Dewey
found himself confronted (German militarism; the effects of propaganda on American society;
the  experience  of  a  two-year  stay  in  China),  the  paper  seeks  to  show  the  various  lines  of
development at work in his thought. The thesis of the paper is that in the war and immediately
post-war years Dewey was concerned with outlining a new account of the nature of theory which
was preliminary to the formulation of his social philosophy. The paper presents Dewey’s main
philosophical achievements, with the aim of providing some background knowledge that could
be useful to understanding that place and significance of the Lectures in China in the overall
context of his thought.
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